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The paper studies the effect that skilled labour mobility has on efficient education policy. The 
model is one of two periods in which a representative taxpayer decides on labour, education, 
and saving. The government can only use linear tax and subsidy instruments. It is shown that 
the mobility of skilled labour well constrains government’s choice of policy instruments. The 
mobility does not however affect second best education policy in allocational terms. In 
particular, education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the 
earnings function is increasing in education. This rule applies regardless of whether labour is 
mobile or immobile. 
JEL-Code: H210, I280, J240. 







Wolfram F. Richter 
TU Dortmund University 





TU Dortmund University 










This version: February 2011 
   2 
1. Introduction 
As a result of globalization capital and labour have become more and more mobile. The 
increased mobility of tax bases constrains governments’ use of revenue raising instruments. 
With lacking international harmonization of taxes, there are strong pressures to shift the 
burden of taxation away from mobile bases towards immobile ones. By doing so, 
governments aim at keeping productive mobile factors within the country. With regard to 
physical capital, the effect of mobility on optimal tax policy is, by now, well understood. For 
surveys of the literature see e.g. Wilson (1999) or Wilson and Wildasin (2004). Less clear is 
how governments should react efficiently when mobility relates to human capital. The aim of 
the present paper is to close the gap and to investigate the implications of skilled labour 
mobility for efficient tax policy. It is shown that the mobility of skilled labour well constrains 
governments’ choice of policy instruments. By contrast, it does not however mean that 
governments should change the policy target in allocational terms. More precisely, it is shown 
that the same rule characterizing second-best education policy when labour is immobile also 
characterizes second-best education policy when labour is mobile. 
The model which allows us to show this is a straightforward extension of the standard two-
period life-cycle representative taxpayer model as used by Richter (2009, 2010). The analysis 
of optimal policy follows Ramsey’s tradition. This means that the government can only use 
linear policy instruments and that the analysis has a pure focus on efficiency. Equity 
considerations are entirely ignored. The interested reader is asked instead to refer to the 
literature as surveyed, e.g., by Carneiro and Heckman (2003). Moreover, the present paper 
focuses on taxation and on the effects the use of potentially distortive instruments has on 
education.  Hence, market failures are not modelled. Specifically, the potential need to 
intervene in education because of market failures is not taken into account. 
The most closely related study is Schuppert (2007). Relying on a model with social mobility, 
she proves that the characterization of efficient education policy is not really affected by the 
mobility of skilled labour. The planner’s first-order conditions are the same. The degree of 
mobility is irrelevant for the characterization of efficient education policy. The present paper 
extends Schuppert’s irrelevance result and proves its general nature. The irrelevance does not 
rely on social mobility. It is obtained instead when mobility is the result of costly investment 
and when the set of distortionary policy instruments is sufficiently rich.  
The results of the present paper and of Schuppert (2007) stand in some marked contrast with 
the literature. Most previous studies dealing with education policy stress the strong effect that   3 
mobility has on optimal government policy. The rule is that mobility has a reducing effect on 
the strength of intervention. There are however differences with regard to the reason. 
According to one reason, the strength of intervention is reduced because of a reduced need. 
The typical scenario is one where the government intervenes because of market failure and 
mobility has an own efficiency enhancing effect. This may be so in the presence of production 
externalities (Stark and Wang, 2002), earning risks (Wildasin, 2000) or time inconsistent 
taxation (Andersson and Konrad, 2003). According to a second reason, the strength of 
intervention is reduced because of some diminished incentives to correct market failures. This 
may be so as a result of tax competition for high-skilled workers (Wildasin, 2000) or in the 
presence of intragenerational spillovers between students (Poutvaara and Kannainen, 2000). 
By contrast, the present paper makes the point that mobility is per se no reason to change 
education policy in allocational terms. The degree of mobility is irrelevant when 
characterizing second-best education policy.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative taxpayer. In 
Section 3 second-best education policy is characterized. It is shown that the second-order 
elasticity rule derived by Richter (2010) for the small open economy equally holds for the 
closed economy. According to this rule, education should be effectively subsidized if, and 
only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. In the following 
sections it is shown that the second-order elasticity rule continues to characterize second-best 
education policy even if labour becomes mobile upon qualification. Various scenarios are 
studied. In Section 4 households only supply qualified labour abroad but they continue to 
consume at home (“labour mobility”). In Section 5 households work and consume abroad 
(“household mobility”). Both Sections 4 and 5 assume taxation according to the residence 
principle. This is different in Section 6 studying efficient tax policy subject to the source 
principle. The planner is then no longer free in her choice of tax instruments. It is clearly not 
efficient to tax mobile labour income at source. However, consumption can be taxed instead. 
It is shown that the switch to the source principle impacts the choice of tax instruments but 
not the planner’s first-order condition of second-best education policy. Section 7 summarizes 
and points out connections to the literature. 
 
2. The model 
The model is taken from Richter (2009, 2010). It assumes a representative taxpayer living for 
two periods  and deriving strictly increasing utility  U  from  consumption  i C   and  strictly   4 
decreasing disutility from non-leisure time  i L  in periods i=1,2. U= 1212 (, ,,) UCC L L  is strictly 
quasi-concave.  2 L  is identical with second-period labour supply. By contrast, only  1 LE −  is 
time spent in the market, while E is time spent on education. First-period labour supply earns 
a constant wage rate  1 ω ; the return to second-period labour depends on the amount of 
education. It is paid  2 () GE ω , where  2 ω  is constant while the earnings function G(E) displays 
positive but diminishing returns, G′>0>G′′. The quantity  2 L  is interpreted as qualified labour. 
Likewise, the quantities  1 LE −  and  1 L  are interpreted as nonqualified labour and nonqualified 
non-leisure, respectively. Education causes an opportunity cost in forgone earnings  and a 
monetary cost of tuition. Both costs are assumed to be linear in time. The cost of foregone 
earnings is denoted by  1 ω E and the cost of tuition is denoted by  E ϕ . The taxpayer has to 
respect the lifetime budget constraint, 
  1 2 11 2 2 / ( ) () / C C L E GEL E ρω ω ρϕ + = −+ − .        (1) 
In order to simply the analysis, consideration is restricted to utility functions which are quasi 
linear in first-period consumption and additive in periodic sub-utilities: 
  1212 (, ,,) UCC L L  =  1 11 22 () (, ) C VL UC L −+           (2) 
The function V  is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The  representative taxpayer 
maximizes  (2) in  1212 , ,,, CCLL  and  E  subject to (1).  This constrained maximization is 
obviously equivalent to the unconstrained one, 
  max  [ 11 2 2 2 ( ) () / / L E GEL E C ω ω ρϕ ρ −+ − − 11 22 () (, ) VL UC L −+ ]  (3) 
in  212 ,, CLL , and E. In what follows it is assumed that this maximization is well behaved. This 
means that there exists a unique interior solution which is differentiable in  12 , ,, ω ω ρϕ. The 
first-order conditions are: 
 
'
1 11 () VL ω =               ( 1 λ )    (4) 
  2 ( )/ L GE U ωρ = −             ( 2 λ )    (5) 
1/ C U ρ =               (β )    (6) 
  221 '( ) / G EL ω ρωϕ = +           (µ )    (7)   5 
The bracketed variables  12 ,, λλβ ,  and  µ   are Lagrange  multipliers of the planner’s 
optimization we are going to set up. Equations (4) and (5) are the FOCs associated with 
optimal choices of non-leisure. Equations (6) and (7) characterize the optimal choice of 
second-period consumption and education, respectively. The price and cost variables 
12 , ,, ω ω ρϕ are quoted after taxes and subsidies. The prices before taxes and subsidies are 
denoted by  12 , ,, wwrf . For the sake of simplicity, first-period prices  1, wf  are assumed to be 
exogenous while second-period prices  2 w  and r are determined endogenously. The production 
of second period commodities,  (,) F FHK = , is assumed to be linear homogeneous in human 
capital H and physical capital K. Profit maximization obviously implies: 
  2 H Fw =               ( w α )    (8) 
  K Fr =               ( r α )    (9) 
The government faces the need to raise a constant amount of revenue T. There are four linear 
tax instruments, each of which is distorting. The taxes are levied on period i’s labour income, 
on capital income, and on the cost of tuition. They are modelled implicitly as the difference 
between prices before and after tax. The tax on period i’s labour income is modelled by 
ii w ω − , the tax on capital income by r ρ − , and the tax on the cost of tuition by  f ϕ − . It 
goes without saying that each tax can well take on a negative value so that it is effectively a 
subsidy.  We first look at second-best policy in the closed economy. This gives us a 
benchmark for second-best policies in the open economy. 
 
3. Second-best policy for the closed economy 
In the closed economy, factor supplies have to equate factor demands: 
  2 () GEL H =               ( H α )    (10) 
  S = K                ( K α )    (11) 
According to equation (10), human capital is equated with the effective supply of qualified 
labour. According to equation (11), physical capital equals savings defined by 
  22 2 [ ( ) ]/ C GEL S ωρ −= .          (σ )    (12) 
In the closed economy, the planner maximizes the representative taxpayer’s utility function 
(3)  in the quantities  212 ,,, CLLE , ,, SHK   and the prices  12 , ,, ω ω ρϕ, 2, wr   subject to the   6 
behavioural constraints (4) – (9), the factor market clearing conditions (10) - (12), and the 
government’s budget constraint, 
  1 11 ( )( ) ( ) w L E fE ωϕ − −+−  
+  22 2 [( ) ( ) ( ) ]/ w GEL r S r ωρ − +−  = T .    (γ )    (13) 
The budget constraint (13) implicitly assumes the existence of government bonds promising a 
rate of return of r. We shall refer to the stated maximization as Problem CE where CE stands 
for the closed economy. Assume that this maximization and all others still to follow are well 
behaved. This means that the planner’s maximization has an interior solution which can be 
characterized by the first-order conditions. The sole objective of this paper is to study the 
effect that the mobility of labour and capital have on the first-order conditions characterizing 
efficient education policy. 
Efficient policy is characterized in terms of wedges. Denote by  
 






                (14) 
the tax wedge on non-qualified labour. It is the wedge with which we are going to relate the 
wedge on education defined by 
  E ∆  ≡ 
22 1
1















.        (15) 
According to the right-hand side of (15),  the wedge on education equals the difference 
between two ratios. The first ratio relates present returns before and after taxes and subsidies 
and the second ratio relates costs before and after taxes and subsidies. Hence the wedge 
vanishes if the ratio in returns equals the ratio in costs. Let us speak of effective subsidization 
if  E ∆  is negative. According to (15), a negative value of  E ∆  is the combined result of all four 
policy instruments. Effective subsidization is clearly reached by the statutory subsidization of 
the cost of tuition. This is however not the only way of reducing  E ∆ . Other effective means 
are (i) increasing the tax on nonqualified labour and thus reducing the opportunity cost of 
education, (ii) reducing the tax on qualified labour and thus increasing the return to education, 
and finally (iii) taxing saving and thus increasing the return to education.  
Denote by   
  1 ν  ≡ 
"'
11 1 / LV V  > 0  the elasticity of marginal disutility of nonqualified labour, i.e. 
the inverse of the wage elasticity. Set   7 
  '/ EG G η ≡     the elasticity and    
  η η  ≡  '/ Eηη     the second-order elasticity of the earnings function. 
 
Proposition 1 (“Elasticity Rule for Education”): If  12 ,, ωω and ϕ  are optimally chosen, 










 .              (16) 
 
Condition (16) has been derived before by Richter (2010) for the small open economy and 
taxes levied according to the residence principle. The condition is shown here to extend to the 
closed economy. This result is a corollary to Proposition 2 derived below. A straightforward 
implication of (16) is that education should not be distorted,  E ∆ =0, if the elasticity of the 
earnings function,  η, is constant. This well-known result -  also  named  the Education 
Efficiency Proposition (Richter, 2009) - has been derived before in more elaborate models 
with heterogeneous taxpayers by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2008).  If  η  fails to be constant,  then  condition (16) requires distorting the choice of 
education in second best. To be more precise assume that that nonqualified labour income is 
taxed,
1 L ∆ >0, and that the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing. In this case, (16) 
suggests  that  education should be effectively subsidized and that the effective rate of 
subsidization should increase monotonically in the second-order elasticity of the earnings 
function. 
 
4. The small open economy and the residence principle 
In the open economy home factor markets need not be cleared. Hence conditions (10) and 
(11) are no constraints to the planner’s maximization. We begin studying efficient policy for 
the open economy by assuming that the residence principle applies in taxation. This means 
that all income earned on savings, rS , is liable to taxation at home. Equally, all qualified 
labour income,  22 () wGEL, is taxed at home. We restrict consideration to the small open 
economy where the factor prices before taxes  2 w  and r are exogenous and determined on 
world markets. The planner is assumed to maximize the representative taxpayer’s utility 
function (3) in the quantities  212 ,,, CLLE ,  S  and the prices  12 , ,, ω ω ρϕ  subject to the   8 
behavioural constraints (4) – (9), the definition of savings (12), and the government’s budget 
constraint (13). We shall refer to this maximization as Problem OE-RP where OE stands for 
the small open economy and RP for the residence principle. 
 
Proposition 2: If returns to scale are constant, the efficient tax structure is independent of the 






− be the Lagrangean objective functions associated with the problems 
CE and OE-RP, respectively. Then 
 
CE Λ  = 
OE RP Λ
− + 2 [ (,) ] wH F HK w α − + [ (,) ] rK F HK r α − + 2 () H GL H α − + () K SK α − . 
Taking partial derivatives of 
CE Λ   with respect to  2 w   and  r  yields  2 / w GL γ ρα =   and 
/ r S γ ρα = . Relying on these conditions, on the factor-market clearing conditions, and on 
linear homogeneity of F one obtains 




CE Λ  =  w Hx r Kx x FF ααα +−  =  2 [ ]/ Hx Kx x GL F SF γ ρα +−  =  x α − . 
for x = H, K. As a result,  









−   for all variables  2,, , x w rHK ≠ . 
This proves Proposition 2.□ 
Proposition 2 is best interpreted as a corollary to the Production Efficiency Theorem of 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). A  priori  it is not perfectly  clear whether the Production 
Efficiency Theorem applies in the present context where the taxpayer earns quasi-pure ability 
rent income,  2 22 1 ( ) max[ / ( ) ]
E Y L GL E ω ρωϕ ≡ −+  > 0. Notice that Proposition 2 is obtained 
without requiring Y to be skimmed off by taxation. 
Proposition 1 is proved by evaluating 





−   for  121 ,,,, x LE ϕω ω = , and S.   9 
Note that the Elasticity Rule holds even if the planner does not optimize with respect to ρ . 
Saving does not need to be taxed efficiently and yet education policy should respect (16). 
Furthermore, the derivation of (16) does not rely on the first-order conditions associated with 
2 C  and  2 L . These two observations will be exploited below. 
 
5. Qualified household mobility 
Problem OE-RP considers households supplying qualified labour abroad without migrating. 
They are immobile and their  qualified labour income earned abroad is taxed at home. 
Compare this scenario with the one in which households become mobile upon qualification. 
This means that they are perfectly mobile in the second period. As before, their income is 
taxed in the country of residence. This scenario can be modelled by adding  
  22 (,) UC L u =                 (17) 
as an additional constraint to the planner’s problem OE-RP. 
 
Proposition 3: The Elasticity Rule for Education continues to characterize second best policy 
even if households become mobile upon qualification. 
 
The proof follows from recognizing that the derivation of (16) makes no use of the first-order 
conditions associated with  2 C  and  2 L . 
 
6. The small open economy and the source principle 
According to the source principle factor incomes are taxed in the country where they are 
earned. Consider the scenario in which households are immobile and in which capital and 
qualified labour are perfectly mobile and taxed at source. As before, the home economy is 
assumed to be small. Hence factor prices before taxes,  2 w   and  r,  are exogenous and 
determined on world markets. As a result, it is inefficient to tax savings or qualified labour 
effectively at source. The planner has instead to respect  
22 w ω =  and  r ρ =                 (18)   10 
as additional constraints. It seems fairly obvious that the Elasticity Rule (16) is not obtained if 
(18) is simply added as an additional constraint to OE-RP. The derivation of (16) relies on the 
assumption that  12 , ωω and  ϕ  are feasible policy instruments. This means in particular that 
qualified labour income can be taxed at some rate that may differ from the tax on nonqualified 
labour and also from the subsidy paid to  the cost of tuition. However, the planner may 
consider substituting the non-available tax on qualified labour by a consumption tax. As 
households are immobile by assumption they cannot evade this tax by migrating. Hence, 
consider the case where consumption is taxed. Two variants are conceivable. According to the 
first, consumption is taxed at rates that may differ between periods. According to the second 
variant, consumption is taxed uniformly. Obviously, uniform taxation is more constraining for 
the planner. Without loss of generality, we only study the uniform case. 
The consumption tax is modelled implicitly by introducing a consumer price q. The difference 
to one,  1 q− , stands for the consumption tax rate. The household’s budget constraint (1) is 
replaced with 
  12 [ /] qC C r + = 11 2 2 ( ) () / L E wGEL r E ωϕ −+ − .        (1’) 
The difference to (1) is that  2, ωρ  have been replaced with  2, wr  and that q appears on the 
left-hand side. The implicit assumption is that payments for tuition are not liable to the 
consumption tax. The planner’s new objective function is 
  max  [
12
1 22 ( ) () / /
w
L E GEL r E C r
qq q
ω ϕ
−+ − − 11 22 () (, ) VL UC L −+ ]  (3’) 
and the control variables are the quantities  212 ,,, CLLE  and the prices  1, ωϕ  and q. 






=                 ( 1 λ )  (4’) 
 




= −               ( 2 λ )  (5’) 
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ρ = +             (µ )  (7’) 
and the government’s budget constraint, 
  1 11 ( )( ) ( ) w L E fE ωϕ − −+− + 12 ( 1)[ / ] q CCr −+  =   11 
  1 11 ( )( ) ( ) w L E fE ωϕ − −+− + 11 2 2
1
[ ( ) () / ]
q




−+ −  = 
1
11 ( )( ) ( ) w L E fE
qq
ω ϕ
− −+−  + 
2




−  = T .    (γ )  (13’) 
We refer to this maximization as Problem OE-SP where SP stands for the source principle. 
 
Proposition 4: Replace the non-feasible tax on mobile qualified labour by a consumption tax. 
The Elasticity Rule for Education then  continues to characterize second-best 
policy even if capital and qualified labour are perfectly mobile and taxed at source.  
 
Proof: Remember that (16) follows from solving  
  max 
OE RP Λ
−  in  1 12 ,, , , LE ωωϕ , and S. 
In particular, (16) does not rely on an optimal choice of  ρ . Hence it is feasible to set ρ =r 
and to treat (12) as a defining equation of S. Therefore, (16) follows after setting  ρ =r from 
solving 
  max 
OE RP Λ
−  in  1 12 ,, , , LE ωω  and ϕ .           (19) 
Now set 
'''
12 ,, ωωϕ  for  12 /, /,/ qw q q ωϕ . Solving (19) is obviously equivalent to  
  max 
OE SP Λ
−  in  1, LE ,
'''
12 ,, ωωϕ .            (20) 
Hence, (16) follows from (20) just as (16) follows from (19).□ 
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that mobility of high skills does not affect second-best policy in 
allocational terms but only the choice of policy instruments. In particular, the tax on qualified 
labour income should be replaced with a tax on consumption when allowing for perfect 
mobility and when taxing according to the source principle. This result clearly generalizes 
previous findings by Schuppert (2007) who shows that the degree of international mobility of 
skilled labour is irrelevant for the characterization of efficient education policy when allowing 
for social mobility. The present study shows that the irrelevance result does not hinge on 
social mobility and that it holds in a much more general sense. More specifically, it holds 
when international mobility is the result of costly investment and when the set of distortionary 
policy instruments is sufficiently rich.   12 
 
7. Summary 
Economists have only recently started to understand the optimal setting of tax incentives for 
education. A major breakthrough is by Bovenberg  and Jacobs (2005).  The  present paper 
contributes to the literature by studying the effect that skilled labour mobility has on efficient 
education policy in Ramsey's tradition. It does so by relying on the standard two-period life-
cycle model of a  representative household with endogenous consumption, labour, and 
education. The sole focus is on efficiency. Equity concerns as well as potential reasons of 
market failure are ruled out. 
For such a setting Richter (2010) derives  the second-order elasticity rule of education. 
According to this rule, education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity 
of the earnings function is increasing in education. More precisely, the effective subsidization 
should increase if the second-order elasticity – the elasticity of the elasticity - of the earnings 
function increases. If the elasticity of the earnings function is constant, education should not 
be distorted in second best. The latter result has become known as the Education Efficiency 
Proposition (Richter, 2009). It has been derived before by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), and 
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008), and Richter  (2009)  in  more elaborate models with 
heterogeneous taxpayers. 
In the present paper it is shown that the second-order elasticity rule of education holds in 
various settings which only differ with respect to the assumed mobility of skilled labour. The 
original version of Richter (2010) is reinterpreted as a version characterizing second-best 
policy for a small open economy in which households are taxed according to the Residence 
Principle while supplying qualified labour abroad but consuming at home. Such a scenario is 
best described as a regime of “qualified labour mobility”. If production displays constant 
returns to scale, the second-order elasticity extends from  the small open economy to the 
closed one with immobile labour (Proposition 2). Section 5 looks at “qualified household 
mobility” which means that households become mobile upon qualification and that they both 
work and consume abroad if they migrate. Assuming taxation according to the residence 
principle, it is shown again that the second-order elasticity rule characterizes the efficient 
education policy of the home country (Proposition 3). 
In a regime in which income is taxed according to the source principle, mobility plays a more 
critical role when designing optimal government policy. For well-known reasons it is not 
efficient to tax mobile income at source. The burden of taxation is shifted backwards on   13 
immobile  factor incomes  and this shifting is costly in terms of efficiency. However, 
consumption can be taxed instead. Accordingly, we argue that  the switch to the source 
principle well impacts the choice of tax instruments but not necessarily the planner’s first-
order condition characterizing  second-best education policy  in allocational terms. More 
specifically, the second order elasticity rule continues to characterize the efficient education 
policy and the rule can be implemented by replacing the tax on mobile labour income with a 
tax on consumption  (Proposition 4). The second best  is however only sustained if the 
consumption tax is combined with instruments targeting immobile labour income and the cost 
of tuition. The optimal signs of these additional instruments deserve specific notice. One may 
be inclined to speculate that immobile labour income should be subsidized in a regime in 
which mobile labour income is not taxed. However, such a speculation is driven by equity 
concerns while the present paper’ sole focus is on efficiency. As Richter (2009) demonstrates 
for a model of differentiated labour taxation, it is second best to distort qualified labour less 
than nonqualified labour. The reason is that the supply of qualified labour is governed by a 
double margin. The tax on qualified labour not only distorts the supply of labour but also the 
choice of education. Applying this result to the present context suggests that the immobile 
labour income should bear a positive tax in second best when the tax on mobile labour income 
is replaced with a tax on consumption financed by both, mobile and immobile labour income. 
The bottom line of  the present paper is that the question of qualified  labour mobility  is 
irrelevant when characterizing efficient government policy in allocational terms. This result 
generalizes previous findings by Schuppert (2007). While she relates her irrelevance result to 
social mobility, the present study shows that the  irrelevance  is obtained if  international 
mobility is the result of costly investments and if the government’s set of policy instruments 
is sufficiently rich. The irrelevance does not hinge on social mobility. Note however that two 
critical assumptions are made. Concerns with regard to equity and market failure have been 
fully ignored. Hence the irrelevance result is one of pure tax efficiency. Further research will 
have to clarify whether the irrelevance result has a chance of surviving when allowing for 
concerns of equity and market failure. 
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